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This article discusses cosmopolitanism as the moral foundation for access to health care for migrants. The focus
is on countries with sufﬁciently adequate universal health care for their citizens. The article argues for equal
access to this kind of health care for citizens and migrants alike—including migrants at special risk such as
asylum seekers or undocumented migrants. Several objections against equal access are raised, such as the
cosmopolitan approach being too restrictive or too permissive, or the consequences being undesirable; but
the objections are largely refuted. Some special cases in which a restriction of equal access to health care might
be justiﬁed are described: humanitarian crisis, short term tourism, and the case of a migrant or refugee who will
stay only very brieﬂy on a state’s territory.
Introduction
Nationals and non-nationals do not have equal access to
health services in many countries. For example asylum
seekers are legally entitled to emergency care in only 10
of 24 European countries (Norredam et al., 2006). The
majority of countries also restrict access to health care
for undocumented migrants in various ways (Cuadra,
2012). Italy, Spain and Canada have been examples for
exceptions to this rule, in that they long provided uni-
versal health care for undocumented migrants and citi-
zens alike. However, Spain has recently restricted health
care for undocumented migrants—and was heavily cri-
ticized for this by the European Committee of Social
Rights (Council of Europe, 2014). Similarly, the
Canadian government has pledged to continue to at-
tempt to scale back on medical entitlements to new-
comers, even though its 2012 cuts to refugee
claimants’ health were found by a Federal Court to vio-
late constitutionally protected rights (Black, 2014).
Such restrictive practices stand in stark contrast to
international human rights law, as outlined in numer-
ous conventions and declarations. These include among
others the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, the
Constitution of the World Health Organization, the
International Convention of the Rights of the Child,
and the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The declarations
emphasize a generalized duty to all persons based on
human rights, which in turn are founded on a cosmo-
politan ethics, which ‘takes the individual to be the ul-
timate unit of moral worth and to be entitled to equal
consideration regardless of her culture, nationality of
citizenship, besides other morally arbitrary facts about
her’ (Tan, 2002, p. 431).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for ex-
ample, states that ‘Everyone has the right to a standard
of living adequate for the health and well-being of him-
self and of his family, including [. . .] medical care [. . .],
and the right to security in the event of [. . .] sickness,
disability’ (United Nations, 1948).
Similarly, Article 12 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) affirms
the ‘Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health’
including not only ‘the prevention, treatment and con-
trol of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other dis-
eases’ but also the ‘creation of conditions which would
assure to all medical service and medical attention in the
event of sickness’ (OHCHR, 1976).
PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS VOLUME 8  NUMBER 2  2015  162–172 162
doi:10.1093/phe/phv014
Advance Access publication on 3 June 2015
! The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. Available online at www.phe.oxfordjournals.org
More recently, binding legal interpretations of the
normative content of the Right to Health focused on
the need for non-discrimination when it comes to
non-nationals. In relation to migrant health general
comments from the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (which monitors implementation
of the ICESCR) set forth clear obligations by specifically
prohibiting migration status as grounds for denying
access to health services: ‘States are under the obligation
to respect the right to health by, inter alia, refraining
from denying or limiting equal access for all persons,
including [. . .] asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, to
preventive, curative and palliative health services’
(CESCR, 2009).
The obligation to ensure access to health care as out-
lined are met only partially, or not at all, in the majority
of countries which provide universal health coverage for
their citizens. The breadth of this gap between interna-
tional law and domestic practice has received increased
attention by activists concerned by lower levels of access
to health care for migrants, and particularly from within
countries that provide universal health coverage for
their own citizens, given the obvious injustice of such
double-standards.
Despite such attention, a detailed discussion of the
normative grounds of the specific type or level of
access to health care is almost entirely lacking.
Although the empirical picture emerging from studies
and reviews that are being conducted is one of great
complexity, the normative one is much clearer: despite
clear obligations set forth in international law certain
groups of migrants do not have equal access to health
care services in most countries, and this situation ap-
pears to be at risk of worsening rather than improving.
Furthermore the number of people who are experien-
cing forced displacement is—for the first time since
World War II—higher than 50 million (UNHCR,
2014). Never then, has scholarly discussion of the
moral foundations of universal health coverage and of
the questions of whether and how states should provide
access to migrant health services, been more timely.
Many fields of study intersect on the question of mi-
grants’ access to health care and this article, although
primarily concerned to apply an ethical theory known as
cosmopolitanism, will draw from them. This is a neces-
sity in part because the question has not been the subject
of direct and discerning debate in any single field of
school of thought more thoroughly. The rights of mi-
grants have been widely discussed by political philoso-
phers, for example, but the specific question of a right to
access to health care for migrants has been only margin-
ally addressed (Carens, 2013). Similarly, moral
philosophers have endeavored extensively to apply the-
ories of justice to the health sector and health policy
formulation (Daniels, 1985; Powers and Faden, 2008;
Venkatapuram, 2011) but few have focused on the spe-
cific situation and vulnerabilities of immigrants.
Scholars concerned with global health ethics have dis-
cussed—among other topics—what affluent states owe
to people living in less affluent countries or to the de-
velopment of their health system (Benatar and Brock,
2011), but much less has been written about what afflu-
ent states owe to non-nationals within their frontiers.
In the face of this general lack, Gillian Brock argues
that a cosmopolitan ethics perspective could provide a
convincing moral foundation for access to health care
for migrants (Brock, 2015). According to her ‘cosmo-
politans standardly believe that every person has global
stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern and is
therefore entitled to equal respect and consideration
no matter what her citizenship status or other affili-
ations happen to be’ (Brock, 2015, p. 3). Thus, Brock
suggests a global justice-based approach in order to
define the level of health care for migrants, and hence
a moral duty to provide health care, in comparison to the
general but in her view mistaken charity-based ap-
proach, which results only in an optional matter at
best. Brock claims that on the basis of cosmopolitanism:
‘we must be willing to address some of the ongoing
vulnerabilities non-compatriots currently face. At least
one effective way in which we can do this is through
addressing the health needs of non-compatriots who
are residents of our community’ (Brock, 2015, p. 8).
She also claims that helping non-compatriots within
borders is not only demanded by cosmopolitanism,
but, as she says, ‘somewhat over-determined by various
ethical frameworks, including those associated with
Good Samaritanism, Obligations of Mutual Aid or the
Duty to Rescue’ (Brock, 2015, p. 8) and that the burden
of proof lies with those who deny the robust claim that
affluent countries have a duty to help vulnerable
migrants.
Brock’s paper offers a convincing start to address
health of migrants through a cosmopolitan lens, but
there are two problems.
First, the application of the cosmopolitan argument
to access to health care for migrants is not spelled out in
detail. It remains particularly unclear what type or level
of access to health care her justice-based account de-
mands for.1
Second, and in relation to the first problem, there is
an irritating tension in Brock’s argument. She
expresses a need to find out, ‘which health needs
count as urgent and what counts as a low to moderate
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cost that we can reasonably be expected to bear’
(Brock, 2015). This fits well with the Duty to Rescue
or Good Samaritanism, which she also refers to. But
isn’t this indirect and maybe unintended implication
of a lower level of health care for migrants as com-
pared to citizens only a half-hearted embrace of
cosmopolitan ethics?
In attempting to overcome some of these tensions
I will use Brock’s article as a starting point by expanding
on earlier ideas (Wild and Heilinger, 2013) to use
cosmopolitanism as the moral foundation for access to
health care for migrants.
Another approach is a useful resource for this article.
In Joseph Carens’ work on the moral rights of undocu-
mented migrants and temporary workers—such as basic
human rights (e.g. freedom of speech or religion), chil-
dren’s rights, work-related rights and social and admin-
istrative rights—Carens argues why these rights should
be equal to those of regular citizens (Carens, 2008,
2013). He provides a detailed analysis of rights related
to earning, working conditions or child education and
provides arguments why it is not justified to apply dif-
ferent rules for ‘irregular migrants’ or temporary work-
ers as compared to regular citizens. His method of
developing arguments and rejecting possible objections
is convincing and a similar method is applied in this
article. However, Carens mentions health care only
very briefly. He merely claims, that every ‘person has a
right to receive lifesaving medical treatment’ (Carens,
2008, p. 167) and calls emergency health care a human
right (Carens, 2013, p. 253). Carens does not specify his
claim further and many questions remain open regard-
ing health.
This article is thus also inspired by Carens’ ideas of
equal rights of migrants and citizens, and it will try to
explain why ‘lifesaving medical treatment’ or ‘emer-
gency health care’ are not the appropriate terms to
aim at.
The principal purpose of this article is to present ar-
guments for a cosmopolitan ethics of migrant health. As
mentioned above, for decades the international law has
been based on a cosmopolitan approach, but this nor-
mative foundation has not been spelled out in more
detail. Ultimately the article intends to answer the ques-
tion: ‘What type or level of access to health care migrants
should receive?’. However, it can only be seen as one first
attempt to spell out cosmopolitanism as the foundation
for the provision of health care. More work needs to be
done to broaden the debate, and contribute to critical
thinking especially around emerging patterns of migra-
tion and alarming trends with regard to migrants’ access
to health care in high-income countries.
The first section provides some clarifications on def-
initions and the scope of the article.
In the second section I argue for universal access to
basic health care for citizens and migrants alike on a
given territory, unless there are justified objections.
I provide one possible way of interpreting the cosmo-
politan argument, and develop the central thesis in three
steps:
(1) Health is a primary good that—prima facie—gen-
erates a cosmopolitan obligation for meeting health
care needs for each human being equally.
(2) The current global health situation is, evidently, far
from ideal given how a large number of human
beings do not even receive basic access to health
care, but for some states it is easily practicable to
provide equal and sufficiently adequate access to
health care for all human beings within its own
territory.
(3) The easy practicability of fulfilling cosmopolitan
demands within borders justifies the moral obliga-
tion especially for affluent countries to provide uni-
versal access to health care for migrants and citizens
alike, unless there are justified objections.
The third section will challenge this central thesis by
discussing possible objections, such as the approach
being too restrictive or too permissive, or the conse-
quences being undesirable. The discussion of the objec-
tions will ultimately help to enforce the central thesis of
equal access to sufficiently adequate health care for all
who are within a state’s territory.
Clariﬁcation of Scope
Some clarifications regarding scope and definitions are
necessary:
First, as many migrants are naturalized citizens or as
they have a residence permit, they are often entitled to
the same ways or levels of accessing health care as citi-
zens are. Thus, not all ‘migrants’ per se are excluded
from certain health services. Those who are at risk of
receiving restricted access to health care (in some
countries, not in every country) and are therefore at
increased risk of illness and the complications of un-
treated illness or injury, are those without a full resi-
dence permit. There is a multitude of subcategories
defining such groups, and the definitions vary from
country to country. Migrants that fall into this cat-
egory are for example refugees, temporary workers,
asylum seekers, undocumented migrants, rejected
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asylum seekers, persons with exceptional leave for hu-
manitarian reasons etc.2 This article specifically
encompasses the situation of these migrant and refugee
groups and I will refer to them in the following as
‘migrants at special risk’.
Second, I will focus only on access to health care, not
on health in general. Health in general is a much wider
field, and requires a far more comprehensive approach,
such as theories of social justice in health (Powers and
Faden, 2008) or theories of just health (Daniels, 2008),
part of which I have addressed elsewhere in relation to
health of asylum seekers (Wild, 2013). Access to health
care is only one aspect, and possibly not the most de-
terminative one, of the relationship between health and
the broader social determinants of well-being, including
housing, employment, education, etc. Furthermore,
equal access to basic health care does not ensure equal
treatment, but this is again an issue beyond the remit of
this discussion.
Third, by equal or universal access to health care
I imply that there must be a sufficiently adequate
health care package provided by the state or entailed
in a health insurance scheme.3 Thus, the argumentation
in this article will inevitably focus on states that can
ensure such kind of health care, for example through
universal health care provided by the government
funded by taxes (e.g. UK); universal health insurance,
paid by employee and employer, and government
paying for those who cannot afford it (e.g. Germany);
universal health insurance, paid by the citizens who
choose from a selection of private plans, and govern-
ment paying for those who cannot afford it (e.g.
Switzerland); or systems which combine elements of
these three types (e.g. Canada). Despite differences in
many details, all these systems have in common that
some kind of universal basic health care is provided for
all, and—if necessary—providing access to the universal
health care also for those citizens who would not be able
to afford fees for health insurance. State subsidies to
provide access for the poor are usually funded by citi-
zens’ taxes.
I will claim that the content of such a sufficiently ad-
equate health care package should be equal for citizens
and migrants alike, hence the type of diagnostic, selec-
tion of covered diseases and possible treatments. It may
be that different administrative ways of accessing this
health care package are necessary for migrants at special
risk, for example by using a different insurance card or
insurance model to protect undocumented migrants
from discovery, but it should be ensured that the
access is barrier-free and even if by a different insurance
model, no hindering steps should have to be taken to
access this sufficiently adequate health care package.
Arguing for Universal Access to
Basic Health Care
As mentioned above the cosmopolitan approach as such
has not been well developed in relation to health care for
migrants. In the following I propose that health is a
primary good that underwrites human capabilities or
opportunities. Health care thus counts as a fundamental
need that justifies both the basic right to have one’s
needs met and a universal cosmopolitan obligation to
attempt to meet the basic needs of every human being
within a single national jurisdiction (i.e. making access
to health care blind to citizenship as a matter of justice).
The universal importance of meeting health needs along
with specifying the role of the state and the rationale for
this role, support the normative claim of equal access to
health care. The claim I make is straightforward and
involves three steps:
1. Health is a primary good that—prima facie—
generates a cosmopolitan obligation for meeting
health care needs for each human being equally.
My argument starts from the widely held premise that
health is a so-called special or primary good. The im-
portance of health derives from it being an essential and
primary contribution to laying the ground for a decent
life. Sudhir Anand (2006) shows that this claim has been
made throughout the ages, from ancient Greek texts to
this day. Amartya Sen, for example, very prominently
classifies health ‘among the most important conditions
of human life and a critically significant constituent of
human capabilities which we have reasons to value’
(Sen, 2006, p. 23). The special importance then to
meet health needs derives from the existential import-
ance of health itself (Walzer, 1983, pp. 86–91; Daniels,
2001). I follow these accounts and presuppose a primary
‘importance to meet health needs’.
Traditionally it has been argued on the basis of the
fundamental importance of meeting health needs that it
is within the responsibility of the state to provide access
to health care for its citizens. Most theories of justice in
health care have incorporated this view, and argue on
the basis of domestic theories of social justice.
Commonly, such theories use the word ‘citizen’ when
arguing for rights and duties in health care, but the ar-
gument here is that a modest extension of this argument
about the fundamental importance of meeting health is
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needed. Since health needs are independent of nation-
ality, the traditional focus on citizens who require health
care has to be extended to include all human beings on a
state’s territory.
This argument is similar to Shlomi Segall’s luck egali-
tarian argument about the non-excludability of health
care: ‘The nonexcludability of medical care, we may say,
is spatial rather than personal. That is to say, it is im-
possible for us to withhold medical treatment from the
needy, not because of her identity of membership (as a
citizen opposed to noncitizen) but because she happens
to be within the political boundaries over which we exert
responsibility for meeting basic needs [. . .]. In other
words, it is the space and not the identity of the indi-
vidual that tracks our obligations here’ (Segall, 2010, p.
80). This form of luck egalitarianist logic which seeks to
compensate for disadvantages that do not lie within the
responsibility of individuals, offers instructive insight. It
specifies how, within a territory, the exclusion of some,
for contingent reasons like place of birth is unjust. In
this regard, Segall’s version of luck egalitarianism also
endorses the universalism at the core of cosmopolitan
thinking, namely that each individual everywhere and at
any time is an ultimate unit of equal moral concern and
deserves to be taken into account as such by all agents,
both political and individual.
Equal moral standing however, generates responsibil-
ities. Brock’s understanding of cosmopolitanism high-
lights the responsibilities to people we do not know,
suggesting that citizenship or other affiliations should
be made independent from the entitlement to equal
consideration (Brock, 2015). Since it is largely uncon-
tested that states are in various ways and at least to some
degree responsible for the provision of health care, it can
thus be argued that ideally, if the cosmopolitan account
is taken seriously, states should find mechanisms to pro-
vide equal access to health care for every person within
their jurisdiction, no matter what residence status the
person has, simply because of the primary and universal
importance to meet health needs.
The core idea of this article is thus that the import-
ance to meet health needs applies to every human being
equally. This universality of needs invites a universality
of access to health care, which is to say in a non-dis-
criminatory way, i.e. independent from morally arbi-
trary factors such as gender, religion or social status,
place but also of birth, nationality, residence status, mi-
gration history etc.
2. The current global health situation is, evidently,
far from ideal given how a large number of human
beings do not even receive basic access to health
care, but for some states it is easily practicable to
provide equal and sufficiently adequate access to
health care for all human beings within its own
territory.
In an ideal world, equal access to health care for all
could be realized if states were to agree to a division of
labor which entails to care for every person under its
jurisdiction. With such a division of labor it would be
feasible to provide health care for all equally.
But even if the countries wanted to adhere to this
ideal better, in the non-ideal world of today, countries
can only provide access to health care if there actually is
some kind of organized health care that one can have
access to. Many countries are not able to provide such
kind of health care and therefore cannot (yet) contribute
to the moral division of labor I described.
Thus, in our non-ideal world there are only a certain
number of rather affluent countries that can actually
participate in the division of labor of providing health
care on a sufficiently adequate level, and those are the
countries, which have functioning health care systems
and sufficient resources. Following the cosmopolitan
approach these countries have the moral obligation to
offer equal access to health care for all on their territory,
including migrants at special risk. Additionally, re-
sources should be collected especially from the more
affluent countries to secure health care provision also
in poorer countries.
It might be perceived as an unjust burden for the
more affluent countries to have a stronger moral obli-
gation to secure health care provision for all on their
territory, whereas poorer countries, where universal
coverage does not exist or is inadequate, might be ex-
empted. However, it is a widely held view in contem-
porary cosmopolitanism that more affluent countries
have a ‘large share of the remedial responsibilities’
(Brock, 2015) in caring for the underprivileged due to
‘the combined force of our patterns of benefit from the
deprivation (and the ways in which the benefits exacer-
bate deprivation), our capacities to assist and to absorb
costs, our ongoing contributions to sustaining the harm,
and our moral responsibilities not to harm the deprived’
(Brock, 2015).
Apart from such remedial responsibilities the argu-
ment of practicability speaks for the obligation to assist
those who are on a certain state’s territory as ‘we are well
placed to help because they [i.e. the non-citizens who are
residents of our community] are geographically prox-
imate’ (Brock, 2015). The migrants at special risk can be
easily reached by functioning health care systems. Many
migrant groups are formally registered, the place of
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living is known, a health care system exists, and thus
there is no logistic, formal or technical barrier to include
them into the existing system. Even those who are un-
documented can be reached through offices that could
provide anonymous health insurance cards and that are
not observed by the migration officials (such or similar
mechanisms exist for example in Italy). Hence, a state
that offers universal and adequate health care for its
citizens should also be capable of expanding the services
to others on its territory due to the geographical prox-
imity and the administrative and logistical competence
over such service institutions. Currently there are no
structures with which a country could provide equal
access to health care for people outside of their nation
borders too. So, even though a cosmopolitan responsi-
bility towards every person in the world who is in need
may be a desirable ideal, technically only those who are
within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state can easily be
included into an existing and sufficiently adequate uni-
versal health care package. I hence come to my conclu-
sion, that:
3. The easy practicability of fulfilling cosmopolitan
demands within borders justifies the moral obliga-
tion especially for affluent countries to provide uni-
versal access to health care for migrants and citizens
alike, unless there are justified objections.
Discussing Possible Objections
According to my central thesis the provision of basic
health care should be equally granted to citizens and
migrants (including migrants at special risk) within a
given country, unless there are justified objections. In
this section I will explore and dismiss various objections.
Objection 1: The scope of ‘equal treatment’ is too
small: Cosmopolitan duties apply worldwide, spe-
cial responsibilities towards people within borders
are not justified.
I have already briefly mentioned this objection above,
but would like to take it up in slightly more detail as it
touches upon the core idea of cosmopolitanism and the
duty not to discriminate between human beings.
In our non-ideal world, it is obvious that many people
outside the borders of a given affluent state do not re-
ceive access to health care. Can a cosmopolitan account
really acknowledge special responsibilities toward
people within borders or is this rather a view that is
more coherent with statism or domestic principles of
social justice?
First of all, I understand cosmopolitanism precisely so
that the state’s responsibility does not end at its borders,
but that it must be expanded globally. Adding a prior-
itarian element to it, cosmopolitanism may even come
along with a special focus on the underprivileged.
Undoubtedly, states should think about strategies how
to improve people’s unmet health care needs in other
countries too. My central thesis entails such a global
responsibility, but it is not made more explicit here be-
cause the global realm is not the focus of this article. Just
because migrants at special risk are being cared for in the
domestic realm does not preclude a state from putting
efforts into meeting health care needs of other people in
need outside of its borders. This demand undoubtedly
derives from a cosmopolitan perspective, and I would
claim that even most reasonable statists would agree
with this thought in general. It is the specific content
of duties, and the extent of responsibilities in which both
accounts differ. Just as a statist’s account that recognizes
states’ duties outside of its borders is not flawed, a the-
oretical foundation based on cosmopolitanism is not
flawed if it recognizes a certain special responsibility
toward people (compatriots and non-compatriots)
within borders (Miller, 1995, p. 111; Brock, 2015). As
mentioned above, the very simple argument for this
special responsibility for all people within borders is
the practicability to define and provide access to
health care only within the own jurisdiction as—given
the current political structure of the world—only there
exist the relevant political, legal and social mechanisms.
Objection 2a: The selection of beneficiaries is unfair:
It is unjustified to use taxes from taxpayers for
equally benefitting non-taxpayers.
Many countries with universal health care provide
assistance to those citizens who—for whatever rea-
sons—are otherwise not eligible for health care. One
might argue that the inclusion of migrants at special
risk as beneficiaries of such welfare is unjust. The general
understanding of welfare states is that there must be
some state income to distribute, which is collected
through taxes. Some might argue that this should
result in a tax-paying in-group which should profit in
return for paying taxes, and a less well taken care of a
non-taxpaying out-group whose needs ought to be satis-
fied for example on the grounds of charity (if at all). This
argument is for example brought forward by Andrea
Sangiovanni who argues that equality is a demand of
justice only between citizens. He follows what he calls
a reciprocity based internationalism: ‘We owe obliga-
tions of egalitarian reciprocity to fellow citizens and
residents in the state, who provide us with the basic
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conditions and guarantees necessary to develop and act
on a plan of life, but not to noncitizens who do not’
(Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 20).
However, in welfare states that value social solidarity
it is self-evident that funds collected through taxes are
redistributed also to people who are not paying the full
amount of taxes themselves. These could be for example
homeless, unemployed, children or people with severe
disabilities. Domestic justice theories provide the moral
reasons for this kind of redistribution to the socially
disadvantaged. However, the group to which domestic
justice applies is usually defined as the citizens or resi-
dents of a certain state. If theories of domestic justice
would explicitly claim that they apply to every person on
a state’s territory, independent from migration or resi-
dence status, such theories might be sufficient for
arguing for universal access to health care for citizens
and migrants alike. However, as domestic justice the-
ories do not emphasize the moral insignificance of na-
tionality, the cosmopolitan account seems to be more
suitable as its core principle is precisely the insignifi-
cance of nationality or residence status. Hence, what
the cosmopolitan approach explicitly adds to a domestic
understanding of justice is that everybody, independent
from nationality, is included into the sphere of respon-
sibility of a given state. There is no other morally justi-
fied way than including all people that can technically be
reached (practicability) through health policy and meas-
ures for access to health care. Hence, taxpayers, and
non-taxpayers who are within the jurisdiction of a
state should be included.
Objection 2b: The selection of beneficiaries is unfair:
Undocumented migrants should be excluded as
they are committing a crime.
Migration that trespasses the regular migration form-
alities is regarded in most places as unlawful. It is polit-
ically debated whether such an undocumented
migration actually constitutes a crime or not. Whether
or not it does is irrelevant for my argument. As I suggest,
the inclusion criteria for states into the universal health
care package should be based on the facts that health is
considered as a primary good resulting in the importance
to meet health care needs; and the practicability for the
state to provide equal access to health care. Just as it is
irrelevant whether a citizen is convicted of a crime or not
for receiving health care, it should be irrelevant whether
a migrant enters the country regularly or irregularly.
To punish undocumented migrants for a (debatably)
unlawful behavior by denying them access to health
care therefore would therefore conflate two fields
that should be explicitly separated (Ashcroft, 2005;
The Lancet, 2007): Migration policy and possibly legal
repercussions on the one side and the provision of access
to health care on the other. Carens spells this ‘firewall
argument’ out in detail by arguing for firm legal prin-
ciples that ensure that the enforcement of migration law
on the one side and the protection of human rights on
the other are separated from one another (Carens, 2013,
p. 133).
Hence, from a cosmopolitan perspective everybody
should be included in universal health care who is on
a state’s territory where such a system exists; and in
order to secure this, health policy and migration
policy should be detached from another.
Objection 3a: The consequences are undesirable:
Provision of equal access to health care will function
as welfare magnet andmore migrants at special risk
can destabilize a nation.
To evoke the argument of welfare magnetism is an
empirical claim and therefore difficult to refute, as em-
pirical facts are the product of multiple influences and
can change over time. Even though some try to empir-
ically prove that good health care does not function as a
welfare magnet for the poor (Kingreen, 2010), I will not
take this path in my argumentation. The part of the
argument that is richer in content is a nationalist
claim that ‘too many’ migrants at special risk might
destabilize a nation’s security or identity. Excessive na-
tionalism has produced and is producing extraordinary
misery, and will not be considered as a notable contrast-
ing theory here. In contrast, very plausible theories of
nationalism or statism endorse the view that a nation
has an ethical value worth of protection. Therefore there
are certain special and justified obligations toward
people belonging to a given nationality or culture, and
this also provides the conditions for (social) justice (e.g.
Miller, 1995). However, whether or not migrants
might interfere with a nation’s identity (and if I were
to discuss it here I would conclude that they do and
should as this can be an enrichment for all, see e.g.
Carens, 1987) is not genuinely decisive for the question
of health care. As I have claimed above health and mi-
gration policy should be detached, and a possible re-
striction of health care should not be used as
deterrence for other migrants at special risk entering
the country (Ashcroft, 2005). The argument of the im-
portance to meet health needs trumps other politically
motivated considerations.
Objection 3b: The consequences are undesirable:
Citizens will revolt against a policy that allows
access to health care for migrants at special risk.
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Some states include migrant groups at special risk
into regular basic health care, but some do not. States
of the latter sort might experience frictions during a
transition period toward a more inclusive welfare
model, ‘since that may evoke resistances of a much
higher order than would arise if people were used to it
and had had their expectations formed by it’ (Nagel,
1991, p. 59). As an empirical counterargument, there
is evidence that public resistance against more restrictive
welfare models is also possible. For example, during the
war in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s the numbers
of people seeking asylum in Germany rose to approxi-
mately 150.000 per year. These high numbers motivated
the German government to change the constitution in
order to reduce and contain the numbers of applicants.
The new law implemented restrictions on many aspects
of living, such as restricted access to health care. This
change was accompanied by strong public protests
against it. Ultimately the law was challenged by the
German constitutional court in 2012, and in the process
of revising the law, the public engagement for more in-
clusive rights for migrants rose again considerably (e.g.
BAGFW, 2014).
Apart from such an empirical counterargument the
claim that there might be even a strong irritation of
some people during a transition period does not result
in the moral argument for equal access to basic health
care itself being flawed, but might lead to some practical
adjustments. Assumptions of possible public resistances
during the implementation of more expansive health
care should be taken seriously, and circumspect policies
should be considered in order to reduce possible fric-
tions, for example through transparent decision pro-
cesses and information campaigns explaining the
policy decisions.
Objection 4a: Less than the regular health care
package will meet needs well enough: Provision of
emergency care is enough.
Some might argue that the call for equal treatment,
including migrants at special risk, will result in too am-
bitious aims and that a less than equal access to health
care for some is equally well justified, or even morally
superior e.g. because it might save expenses within a
national health care system. As I have claimed above,
it would be a denial of the cosmopolitan theory to offer
two different levels of access to health care for reasons of
nationality or residence status, unless there are justified
objections. Can we, hence, find an objection that justifies
emergency care for some only? One possible scenario
could be for example a sudden influx of large numbers
of refugees, for example in the case of war or other
humanitarian catastrophes. In this case the technical
practicability to reach everyone equally might not be
given as hospitals and staff would not be equipped to
provide universal health care for everyone. Hence, if a
country rapidly sets up refugee camps in order to ac-
commodate thousands of refugees who arrive simultan-
eously it might only be feasible to provide as good health
care as possible in order to reach the highest number of
people in need of medical care. In this case some prin-
ciples of disaster ethics might apply, which could entail
to care for urgent conditions as a priority (O’Mathu´na
et al., 2014).
Another justification for providing emergency care
only might be if a person stays for a short and defined
time on a given territory, for example in the case of
tourism. Such a tourist could, in case of a chronic dis-
ease or elective surgery, bring sufficient medication for
the duration of the trip or return to her home country in
order to receive adequate treatment.
Also, in some cases of migration it could be assumed
that the decision will be rapidly made whether a person
can stay in a country (as a refugee) or whether she has to
leave the country again (e.g. as a rejected asylum seeker).
The person could then seek medical care for more than
emergency care, such as chronic or preventive measures,
in the new place of residence. However, evidence shows
that many asylum seekers stay for months or years in a
given country, despite regulations to process requests
quickly, before any kind of decision of the future itin-
erary of that person is made. In any other case (than a
humanitarian disaster or the case that a person will leave
the country very soon again), a plausible division of
emergency care from basic health care cannot be justi-
fied from a cosmopolitan perspective.
There is an additional reason, independent from
cosmopolitanism, that argues against a restriction of
universal health care to, e.g., emergency care only,
which I will call the argument of implausibility, as I
will explain now.
If, in general—independently from the discussion of
migrants—a state with universal coverage decides upon
a basic health care package that will be covered, the state
will most probably not only include emergency care into
this package for several reasons:
First of all, it is in the interest of the individual person
affected that diseases are being treated properly (as en-
tailed in most basic health care packages) and not only
in emergency cases. Most importantly, it alleviates per-
sonal suffering and provides the conditions for a decent
life.
Second, it is not state of the art in medicine to provide
emergency care only, if an acute condition might just be
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an exacerbation of a chronic condition, and if this is not
the case, if it might be that there is reason to suspect
other than the presented acute condition. If a physician
is aware of an underlying or an additional condition
needing more than emergency care and if she has the
technical means to treat, it is her professional duty to
treat or to make sure someone else will care for it. It
would create a professional conflict for the physician to
demand that only the given acute condition is treated
even though the infrastructure for diagnosis and treat-
ment of an underlying cause or any other condition are
technically available and if the person affected has no
other alternative to access this infrastructure.
Moreover, it is well established that it is in the interest
of the public health to treat people living together in a
certain community not only in emergency cases, but to
also provide preventive care, to vaccinate and to moni-
tor and treat any other health condition properly so that
possible factors that might negatively affect the public
health can be cared for efficiently.
There is hardly any evidence comparing whether it is
more cost effective to treat chronic conditions regularly
or to treat acute exacerbations only, but one can assume
that the latter will be more costly on the long run. In any
case, it is well proven that it is more cost-effective to
treat conditions outside of emergency rooms if possible
(Weinick et al., 2010).
It is therefore plausible for a state to include treatment
for acute, chronic and preventive conditions in univer-
sal health care packages, and it is not plausible from an
individual, medical, public health and very likely also
from an economical perspective to provide emergency
care only. The reason for not separating emergency from
more expansive or chronic care is thus its implausibility.
If a country decides to offer only a restricted health
care package to certain groups (even though it would be
technically feasible to include them), I assume this can
only be understood as a deterrence, as a disincentive for
the others to become a member of this ‘out-group’. In
the case of migrants at special risk, a restriction of access
to health care would function as a deterrence to enter the
country or as an incentive to leave it soon again. This
brings me back to my two arguments of the need to
detach health care from migration policy, and the im-
portance to meet health care needs, which both ask for
the inclusion of migrants into the regular basic health
care packages.
Objection 4b: Less than the regular health care
package will meet needs well enough: this could be
founded on principles of charity instead of a cosmo-
politan account.
The scope and definition of charity versus justice is
contested. In an attempt to structure the debate,
Buchanan classifies justice as a matter of rights. In con-
trast, duties of charity are duties to help others in need
where the kind and amount of aid are left to the discre-
tion of the benefactor (Buchanan, 1987). Hence, in the
provision of health care, one could argue that it is merely
a duty of charity to provide health care for migrants, and
that—as the amount of aid is left to the discretion of the
benefactor—it could be justified to provide e.g. emer-
gency care only.
However, again, the importance of meeting health
needs makes it impossible to consider it as a duty of
charity or to consider it as covered by providing emer-
gency care only. The distribution of such an existentially
important good cannot be left to the discretion of the
benefactor. Moreover, the implausibility of dividing
emergency from chronic and/or preventive care, which
I have shown above, can also be held against a charity-
based approach that claims emergency care to be
sufficient.
Conclusion
I have refuted statist theories and charity-based
approaches to define the exact level of health care for
migrants. The theoretical approach that comes closest to
a cosmopolitan account for providing health care for
migrants are theories of domestic justice. They are well
prepared to provide a plausible argumentation for uni-
versal access to health care for all within a given juris-
diction. However, theories of domestic justice have so
far failed to explicitly claim that they apply to anyone,
regardless of migration or residence status. This is the
reason why cosmopolitanism, which puts the insignifi-
cance of nationality at the center of its theory, seems to
be most appropriate to address the question at hand.
As the ideas developed in this article have not yet been
widely discussed, this article seeks to stimulate that dis-
cussion by trying to posit a clear and firm, if prelimin-
ary, argument. Many complex questions remain,
including: Should responsibilities to include migrants
within health care coverage be the same for each country
with universal health care coverage or do more affluent
countries have more responsibilities? Could reciprocal
billing among affluent states also be an option to meet
cosmopolitan demands? How should special cases be
approached, such as a migrant whose visa has expired
or soon will expire and who needs an organ transplant,
but whose life will thereafter depend on medicines that
are unavailable in her home country? And how should
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affluent countries respond to the refusal of other
wealthy nations to recognize even a minimal respect
for the human rights of irregular migrants, as is, for
example, current Australian policy, which seems to cat-
egorically reject cosmopolitanism itself (McNeill, 2003;
Henderson, 2014)?
A particularly crucial challenge to the approach de-
veloped in this article lies in ensuring that gains in health
justice do not come at the expense of losses elsewhere:
whether, for example, the focus on health care might
risk exacerbating other exclusionary practices in other
domains, such as support for migrants in adequate
housing, education, or whether it might lead to harsher
immigration policies. Although this article argues for a
cosmopolitan approach to deciding the level of migrant
access to health care, this does not mean that this should
result in a trade-off with different social goods. Claiming
that health is a primary good does not mean that it is the
only primary good, or that it should trump other rights,
such as to seek asylum, or to adequate housing and edu-
cation. On the contrary, to argue for a cosmopolitan
approach in health is implicitly to argue for a cosmo-
politan approach in all other domains as well. Again,
such questions remain largely underdiscussed, and
demand further ethical and political debate to see how
the various rights of all people can be justifiably
accommodated.
In sum, this article has taken Brock’s cosmopolitan
argument for health care for migrants as a starting
point (Brock, 2015) and it has expanded on Carens’
argumentation for equal rights of citizens and migrants
(Carens, 2008, 2013). It has tried to combine and de-
velop both approaches by spelling out in fuller detail
the cosmopolitan argument and using that to answer
the question of what level of health care is owed to non-
nationals.
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Notes
1. Brock leaves this explicitly open. In order to deter-
mine the type of level of access to health care, she
calls for robust empirical data in order to determine
specific duties.
2. I sum up these groups very roughly here, there are
many more variations or overlaps of migrants’
status. I explicitly include refugees under the very
broad term ‘migrant’ in this article too. This differs
from the definition the UNHCR uses, which separ-
ates migrants (who, according to their definition
‘choose to move’) from refugees (who are ‘forced
to flee’) (see UNHCR on Mixed Migration: http://
www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16aac66.html, last accessed
24 April 2015).
3. It goes beyond the scope of this article to discuss
what constitutes a sufficiently adequate health care
package. One possibility is to define this domestic-
ally. According to Walzer, for example, there is no
absolute amount of health care that should be dis-
tributed, instead, the specific sufficiency thresholds
should be identified through democratic processes
in a given country (Walzer, 1983, p. 90).
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